A signal from the United States that it remains open to inclusion of the Haqqani network in a peace deal for Afghanistan has made it abundantly clear why the Barack Obama administration is reluctant to declare the group a “foreign terrorist organization” despite blaming the Haqqanis for the audacious September 13 attack on the US Embassy in Kabul.
Washington knows very well that the Haqqani network is a key player in Afghan politics and will play a part in determining the kind of Afghanistan the Americans will leave behind more than a decade after the invasion. Even so, US drone attacks targeting key members of the group continue, with reports that a senior commander of the network was killed in a US drone strike in northwestern Pakistan on Thursday.
“Where we are right now is that we view the Haqqanis and other of their ilk as, you know, being adversaries and being very dangerous to Americans, Afghans and coalition members inside Afghanistan, but we are not shutting the door on trying to determine whether there is some path forward,” United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told Reuters on October 11 when asked if she believed members of the Haqqani network might reconcile with the Afghan government.
Clinton is extending the informal offer of peace talks at a crucial time when the US State Department is under pressure refraining from officially designating the Haqqani group as a terrorist organization. The Obama administrations’s changing stance shows that the Americans don’t want to close the door on negotiations since a terrorist tag would make it impossible to hold talks with Haqqanis, as that would violate American criminal law.
Admiral Mike Mullen, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, declared last month the lethal network was “a veritable arm of the [Pakistani] Inter-Services Intelligence which exports violent extremism to Afghanistan”. However, the White House has already backed away from the assertions of Mullen, who was the top US military officer until his retirement last month.
Sirajuddin Haqqani, the elusive chief of the network, a key component of the Taliban-led Afghan insurgency, claimed in an October 3, 2011, interview with the BBC that he had been approached by the United States to join the Afghan government.
“Right from the first day of [the] American arrival till this day, not only Pakistani but other Islamic and other non-Islamic countries including America, contacted us and they are still doing so. They are asking us to leave the ranks of Islamic emirates,” he said, referring to the Taliban leadership. He said the outsiders promised an “important role in the government of Afghanistan” as well as negotiations.
While confirming Sirajuddin Haqqani’s claim, the Wall Street Journal reported on October 5 that senior US officials secretly met with leaders of the Haqqani network this summer in an effort to draw them into talks on winding down the war. The report quoted some senior US officials as saying there had been at least one meeting over the summer between Haqqani representatives and US officials, which was set up by the ISI.
The US military leadership has repeatedly blamed the Haqqani network for most of the terrorist attacks on international forces stationed in Afghanistan, and on September 29 the US Treasury Department imposed sanctions on Sirajuddin Haqqani and several other group leaders on in the wake of the September 13 attack in Kabul. “These financiers and facilitators provide the fuel for Afghan Taliban, Haqqani Network and al-Qaeda to realize their violent aspirations”, David Cohen, the Under Secretary of the US Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, said in a statement.
Yet the move has failed to dissipate mounting pressure on the White House to place the Haqqani group, whose attacks threaten to become a major obstacle to US hopes for a smooth withdrawal from Afghanistan, on the State Department’s list of designated terrorist organizations. Responding to growing demands from American lawmakers to tag the Haqqani network as a terrorist group, Clinton on September 28 said the United States was close to a decision on whether it make such a declaration.
“We are in the final, formal review that has to be undertaken to make a government-wide decision to designate the network as a foreign terrorist organization,” Clinton told reporters in Washington. Veteran US lawmakers such as Democrat Dianne Feinstein, the head of the Senate Intelligence Committee, and Carl Levin, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, had urged Clinton to put the Haqqani network on the terrorism blacklist, saying there was no question it merited inclusion.
However, in making the October 11 statement suggesting the US wants to keep its options open for a deal with the militant groups as it seeks peace in a region known for historic merry-go-round of political and military alliances, Clinton has indicated the Haqqanis will stay off the terrorist list in near future, mainly because Washington considers it as being in the strongest position among militant groups to unravel the American plan plan of stabilizing Afghanistan before the scheduled withdrawal next year.
In contrast to the American perception of the Haqqanis, the Pakistani military and intelligence establishment considers the group a strategic asset. Their relationship is several decades old and is also mutually beneficial. Unlike the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (Pakistan Taliban – TTP), the Haqqanis have no grouse against Islamabad; their goal, instead, is to have a stake in the dispensation of Kabul once the Americans leave. Considering that 15,000 fighters are said to be under the control of the Haqqani network, a necessary factor for forging a peace settlement in Afghanistan is either their weakening or cooperation.
A weakened Haqqani network would also mean less leverage for Pakistan to influence events in Kabul. With India on the east, Pakistan does not want a hostile regime in the west. This is why Pakistani army commanders, at a September meeting led by Army Chief General Ashfaq Kiani, categorically ruled out a military offensive against the Haqqani network. In addition, the generals say that yet another operation in Pakistan – that too under the American pressure – would alienate the Pakistanis.
The story of the Haqqani network is entwined with the history of wars and coups and armed foreign interventions in Afghanistan. The network’s founder, Maulvi Jalaluddin Haqqani, was initially a member of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e-Islami, which in the 1970s was waging a battle against Afghan president Sardar Daud over his crackdown on nascent Islamists influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood.
Daud’s implacable opposition to the Hizb prompted its leaders to shift to Pakistan, where subsequently a faction under Maulvi Yunis Khalis split away from Hekmatyar. Haqqani emerged as one of the more important commanders of the Khalis faction.
In 1979, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Jalaluddin shifted his family and fighters from his home province of Khost to North Waziristan, from where he launched deadly sallies against the Russians in Afghanistan. Through the 1980s Jalaluddin worked in tandem with the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which treated him as a commander of formidable power and repute, worthy of an invitation to meet then-president Ronald Reagan at the White House. Pakistani Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar was correct in describing the Haqqani network as the “blue-eyed boy” of the CIA for many years.
As the CIA feted and fawned over Jalaluddin, he didn’t disappoint, becoming the first resistance leader to capture a city – Khost – from the Soviet-backed Najibullah government in 1991. He was appointed justice minister in the first Mujahideen government in 1992, but switched his allegiance to the Taliban as they threatened Kabul. The Afghan Taliban and Maulvi Jalaluddin Haqqani shared a common friend in the ISI. As Taliban commander in 1996-97, he was accused of killing members of Afghanistan’s Tajik minority. The shift in allegiance won him a post in the Taliban council of ministers, and he was the governor of Paktia province at the time the Americans invaded Afghanistan in 2001.
As the American juggernaut swept through Afghanistan, and Khost came under increasing pressure, Jalaluddin was back in North Waziristan, from where he directed his network of Islamic fighters to destabilize the eastern part of Afghanistan – Paktia, Paktika, Khost, Ghazni, and Wardak – through attacks on the Americans. The Haqqani network’s rising curve in the badlands of Afghanistan can be gleaned from the attacks it has been accused of masterminding even in Kabul.
In his late 60s, Jalaluddin is now more a patriarch than a commander. The network’s fighting strategy is now the responsibility of his son, Sirajuddin Haqqani, who doesn’t carry a gun, refuses to move in a motorcade, and refrains from wearing a turban lest he is identified and targeted through drone attacks. The 33-year old, known as Khaleefa among his fighters, is the second son of Jalaluddin Haqqani and is currently leading the network. Sirajuddin was nominated as the operational commander of the network when Jalaluddin Haqqani sidelined himself from the ground offensive.
An active member of the Mullah Omar-led Taliban Shura, or council, Sirajuddin is considered a fearless commander who used the influence of his ailing father not only to reactivate the anti-US Taliban fight (which was reeling after the American invasion) but also to make his network a force to be reckoned with. From safe houses and mountain hideouts, he has orchestrated some of the more brazen attacks on US troops in recent months, eclipsing even his father in influence and power. He is on the FBI’s “kill or capture” list and carries a US$50 million bounty.
Sirajuddin’s political deputy Jan Baz Zadran was reported killed in a US drone strike near Miran Shah, the main city in the North Waziristan on Thursday. At least four people were killed in the strike, while at least another three were killed in a separate drone strike on the Birmil area of South Waziristan, according to the al-Jezeera web site. Zadran was in charge of the network’s finances and weapons and ammunition acquisitions.
The success of the Haqqanis prompted the Taliban to claim the network as their own. In a September 27 statement, a Taliban spokesman said, “Jalaluddin Haqqani is part of the Taliban movement, being one of its dignified and honorable personalities. Haqqani isn’t leading a separate militant group and still take his orders from the Taliban Shura.” Many analysts believe that claim is debatable, and the Haqqani network can be best regarded an independent outfit owing nominal allegiance to the Taliban.
The lethal network broadly consists of four groups: those who served under Jalaluddin Haqqani during the Russian occupation of Afghanistan; those from Loya Paktiya who joined the Haqqani movement in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan in 2001; fighters from North Waziristan in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan, who have been associated with Haqqanis over the years; and non-Pashtun foreign militants, including Arabs, Chechens, and Uzbeks.
While the fighters of Haqqani network in Afghanistan belong to a number of tribes, the vast majority of its leaders in North Waziristan are from the Zadran tribe, and in particular from Haqqani’s Mezi clan and its allies. This does not mean, however, that the Haqqanis run a tribal movement. Under the secretive conditions in which the network operates, only those bound closely by Haqqani family or clan ties can win the leadership’s trust.
Jalaluddin Haqqani had two wives, one of them an Arab from the United Arab Emirates, from whom he had two sons. It is this Arab connection that is said to have enabled Jalaluddin to develop contacts with rich Arab sheikhs who finance his armed struggle in Afghanistan.
The Haqqani’s opposition to the Americans hasn’t been without a price. Jalaluddin has lost more family members than other Afghan Mujahideen leaders, first against the Soviets and later against the US-led NATO forces. Two of his sons – 17-year old Omar and 22-year-old Mohammad – have already been killed. Omar was killed in a firefight with US-led forces at Satto Kandao in Khost in 2008, while Mohammad was killed in a drone attack at Miramshah, North Waziristan, in 2009. A year before, another American drone strike killed his two wives, his sister, sister-in-law and eight of his grandchildren.
The Haqqani network’s central leadership rests with the family: Sirajuddin masterminds terror attacks, his first cousin Mullah Sangeen Zadran coordinates them alongside Badruddin, another Haqqani scion. In 2009, Washington announced a $5 million bounty on Sirajuddin and later announced reward for his two other brothers – Badruddin and Naseeruddin.
Naseeruddin, a son of Jalaluddin through his Arab wife, is the group’s principal fundraiser, who as an Arabic speaker has acted as a liaison with several important al-Qaeda figures. His Arab link is said to be a crucial factor in the group’s ability to raise finances in the Gulf, enabling it to maintain a large contingent of fighters. Other funding sources include cross-border smuggling, kidnapping for ransom, the collection of donations through mosques, taxation of trade in areas under their control, and extortion from trucking companies.
Asked in an interview with Reuters on September 23 whether he had 10,000 militants under his command, Sirajuddin laughed and said, “That figure is actually less than the actual number.” Most analysts believe Sirajuddin consented to the rare interview to ease the pressure on the ISI for harboring the Haqqani network. He warned the US against attacking North Waziristan, threatening to inflict greater losses on Americans than they have been encountering in Afghanistan.
About the recent attacks in Kabul, he said, “For some reasons, I would not like to claim that fighters of our group had carried out the attack on the US embassy and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization headquarters. Our central leadership, particularly senior members of the Shura, suggested I should keep quiet in future if the US and its allies suffer in future.”
Sirajuddin also said he had turned down several requests for talks with the Karzai government and the US, though he expressed his willingness to come to the negotiating table should the Taliban too participate in peace parleys. He said, “They offered us very, very important positions, but we rejected [them] and told them they would not succeed in their nefarious designs. They wanted to divide us, and any further efforts to do so will also fail.”
Sirajuddin insisted, “The Haqqani group no longer has sanctuaries in Pakistan … Gone are the days when we were hiding in the mountains along the Pak-Afghan border. Now we consider ourselves more secure in Afghanistan besides the Afghan people.”
Contrary to Sirajuddin’s assertions, Western intelligence agencies have provided credible information to their Pakistani counterparts that the Haqqani network still operates from Pakistan. The North Waziristan-based Pakistan chapter of the Haqqani network, which is called the Miram Shah Shura, reportedly operates from three compounds. The first one is in the Miram Shah bazaar in a religious seminary; the second camp is in the neighborhood of Sarai Darpa Khel, while the third is in the suburb of Danday Darpa Khel, where most of the Haqqani network leaders live and take important decisions, especially pertaining to the military strategy of the network. The drone attack reported to have killed Jan Baz Zadran on Thursday took place at Danday Darpa Khel, just west of Miran Shah, the Washington Post reported.
Sirajuddin oversees the political and military activities of the Miram Shah Shura besides serving as the main liaison to the infamous Quetta Shura Taliban, the leadership body of the Taliban, led by Mullah Muhammad Omar, as well as to the leadership of the Pakistani Taliban. Western intelligence agencies believe Sirajuddin travels regularly into Afghanistan to coordinate with field commanders and occasionally to Peshawar and South Waziristan to connect with al-Qaeda and Taliban-linked militants.
Sirajuddin’s deputy commander in the Miram Shah Shura is Bakht Jan, a major figure in North Waziristan who plays an important role liaising with the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan, led by Commander Hakeemullah Mehsud, and other Taliban groups based in North Waziristan. Many brothers and uncles of Bakht Jan are Haqqani network commanders, who are active in Loya Paktiya. Two other key members of Miram Shah Shura network are Haji Khalil and Haji Ibrahim, the brothers of Jalaluddin.
After being branded by the Americans as a “veritable arm” of the ISI, Sirajuddin claimed in his October 3 interview with the BBC that his group did not kill the former Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani and denied any links with the Pakistani spy agency. He claimed that the “Islamic Emirate”, the name given to the Taliban government when they assumed power in Afghanistan in 1996, was behind “the attack on the US embassy, NATO headquarters and other attacks in Kabul,” which he said were actually ordered by a military council of Taliban. Asserting that the “game being played by the West … is close to an end”, Sirajuddin said, “in every operation we get the order, planning and financial resources from the Taliban Emirate’s leadership and we act accordingly.”
The chief of the Haqqani network pledged loyalty to the amir of the Afghan Taliban, Mullah Mohammad Omar, saying, “he is our leader and we totally obey him.” But despite Sirajuddin’s allegiance to the Afghan Taliban, most analysts believe that it is his network which will eventually determine the kind of Afghanistan the Americans leave behind. And probably that’s why, they say, the US has not yet declared the Haqqani network a foreign terrorist organization, as was the case with the Afghan Taliban.
The Islamic Movement of Taliban or “Tahrik-e-Islami’a Taliban” (the Quetta Shura or Afghan Taliban) was designated as a “Foreign Terrorist Organization” under the US Treasury Department’s Executive Order No. 13224, which was issued on September 23, 2001. The current status of the Haqqani network as an insurgent group allows the White House to hold talks without breaking American criminal law – unless, like the Afghan Taliban, it is declared a terrorist outfit.
Amir Mir is a senior Pakistani journalist and the author of several books on the subject of militant Islam and terrorism, the latest being The Bhutto murder trail: From Waziristan to GHQ.